Showing posts with label Disaster management. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Disaster management. Show all posts

Monday, 16 January 2012

Preliminary Lessons from the 'Costa Concordia' shipwreck


Davos (CH), 16 January 2012. The Costa Concordia shipwreck offers some interesting observations about risk and its effect upon disaster and about evacuation. First, let us examine the question of what happened.

The Costa Concordia is a Concordia Class ship of 114,500 gross tonnage, 51,387 tonnes displacement. It was built in 2005 at Sestri Ponente, Liguria, Italy, and completed its maiden voyage in June 2006. It is owned by the UK-US company Carnival Corporation plc, the world's largest cruise ship operator. The ship was commanded by Captain Francesco Schettino, who joined Costa Cruises in 2002 and was made captain in 2006.


In the evening of Friday 13 January 2012 the Costa Concordia deviated from its regular programmed route through the Tyrrhenian Sea in order to make a close approach to Giglio, an island in the Tuscan Archipelago close to the Argentario Peninsula. Giglio is 23.8 sq. km in size, has a population of 1,458 and is economically dependent on fishing and tourism. The Costa Concordia had carried out a similar manoeuvre in August 2011, which led some people on the island to comment that it was dangerously close.


The alteration of course was not approved by the operating company and involved cancelling alarms and part of a pre-programmed route. At about 21.40 hrs CET while about 150 m from the coast of Giglio the ship struck a rock, which tore a rift about 70 m long and up to 48.8 m wide in port side of its hull (the Costa Concordia is 290.2 m in length). This caused the ship to decelerate rapidly from 15 to six knots and created a pronounced list as compartments below the waterline flooded. The ship then beached on a coastal shelf 37 m deep and less than 100 m from the coast. It was inclined at 60-70 degrees and about half-submerged.


There were 4,229 people on board, of whom about 1,000 were personnel from the multinational crew. The rest were passengers from different countries. They were evacuated over a period of less than two hours, mostly by life-raft but in a few cases by swimming ashore (and thus risking hypothermia). At the time of writing this, six bodies have been recovered and 24 passengers and four crew members are still missing, which amounts to a potential mortality of 0.5%. Sixty-four people were injured, mainly through broken limbs, cuts and abrasions and exposure or mild hypothermia.


The captain and first officer were detained by the police with the possibility that they would be indicted for manslaughter. At the time of writing efforts are underway to remove 2,380 tonnes of fuel oil from 17 double-hulled tanks and four other containers. If the oil escapes, serious damage could be done to sea-floor ecology in the vicinity of a marine reserve. Early indications are that the ship may be declared a constructive total loss, with a cost of about $500 million, and that Carnival Corporation will suffer a loss of earnings of $85-95 million in the current financial year, including the effect of the drop in value of its shares. Nevertheless, as I write negotiations are underway to conduct salvage and reflotation.


The following preliminary observations can be made on the basis of the incomplete evidence that is publicly available at the time of writing, less than three days after the event.

Risk taking. It appears that the unauthorised approach to Giglio involved substantial risk to the safety of the ship, and probably more risk than was in any way acceptable. One wonders what procedural mechanisms existed in the company to limit or avoid such risks? The technical mechanisms appeared to have been satisfactory but could be overridden. It is as well to remember that an interview with Captain Smith of the Titanic, shortly before its last voyage, recorded him as saying that his career had been distinguished by how uneventful it had been. Maritime risk is not a continuum but a spiky phenomenon, and one that can harbour great surprises (if I may be forgiven an instant of inadvertent levity).
 
Alarm. The first sign of problems involved a "boom and groan" noise and a substantial jolt as the ship rapidly decelerated, which also toppled or threw objects around on board. Apparently, passengers did not raise the alarm by calling external authorities for about an hour. In the meantime they were advised that there had been an electrical fault. Quite probably, passengers and crew experienced normalcy bias, the desire to believe the least threatening hypothesis. In some respects, the situation was analogous to that of the MS Estonia, which sank in the Baltic Sea in 1994 with the loss of 851 lives, 85 per cent of those on board. Over a 45-minute period, the Estonia listed 30-40 degrees before listing 90 degrees, which made evacuation from lower decks impossible. Listing was rather less on the Costa Concordia, but it nevertheless complicated movement aboard the ship. The first advice to passengers appears to have been to go to their cabins. This highlights the management difficulties experienced in the 'hiatus period' when managers do not have enough information to determine a reliable strategy and thus tend to require passive behaviour from those people they have to manage.

Evacuation. Comprehensive training meant that procedures were clear. However, despite drills, passengers had no experience of evacuation and some underestimated the risk and behaved inappropriately. A degree of chaos is inevitable in such conditions as listing complicates the launch of life rafts. Unlike the Titanic, which was grossly undersupplied with lifeboats, the Costa Concordia had some redundancy in its life raft accommodation. Nevertheless, it is difficult to launch 150-170 people into the sea from a severely listing ship. An amateur video shot by one of the evacuees was widely circulated in the mass media with the title "Lifeboat panic caught on film." However, when one watches the video clip, it tends to show the opposite, and thus confirm the absence of panic rather than its prevalence, as in so many previous disasters. Nevertheless, as fear of entrapment is one of the principal causes of panic, the conditions were ripe for it to break out, as it did on the Estonia when listing became chronic and movement was inhibited. An element of luck intervened: the ship beached on a coastal shelf in calm weather. In stormier conditions it could have slid into deeper water and sunk completely without the opportunity to evacuate almost all people on board. In valediction, there does not appear to be evidence of discriminatory evacuation which might have put vulnerable people at risk, even though at least two of the dead were senior citizens of advanced age.

Management of the aftermath. Costa Cruises appears to have adopted a standard business continuity crisis management approach based on comprehensive communication. The company distanced itself from the decision-making process that led to the disaster. It will require substantial resources in order to deal with claims: millions of euros of money and assets were abandoned aboard. There is thus a need for a system rather like the one developed by SAS Airlines and promoted by IATA for dealing with the administrative needs after an air crash—but on a larger scale.

Shore-based civil protection and coastguard forces appear to have acted well, although as in many such cases it took vital time for the enormity of the situation to be appreciated in full. The management reliance on the Prefecture of Grosseto (the province in which the disaster occurred) confirms the persistence of the 1990s model of civil protection in Italy, despite the reforms intended in the Bassanini decree-law of 1998, articles 107 and 108 of which shifted the balance of power to the regions.

Media response. Early reports reflected some of the uncertainties garnered from a mass of differing perceptions of the event. Whether the crew acted efficiently in the evacuation or not, whether the alarm was sounded in the right manner or not, whether there was panic and how much danger was involved in reaching the shore, and whether the captain abandoned ship before some of the passengers and crew are all examples of matters that were not reported reliably, perhaps with some reason. Despite the purveyance of conflicting information, the reporting was relatively free of the usual distortions. This may have been because the end result of the disaster was much less severe than it could have been if the ship had, for example, sunk in deeper water. Hence, the pervasive desire to blame was muted in this case. Human error undoubtedly played a part, negligence may have been a factor, but there was no great desire to accuse. There might have been in a more severe disaster, and in that case accusations would undoubtedly have been launched more freely. Nonetheless, the media's incessant emphasis on 'human interest' stories provided an unbalanced overview of the difficulties of evacuation, much skewed towards the extreme conditions related by a minority of people who had a relatively hard time.

Conclusion. No doubt other lessons will emerge, and these lessons will be qualified by new information. In the meantime, in one respect the Costa Concordia disaster reminds one of the Buncefield oil storage depot explosion and fire in Hertfordshire, England in 2005: out of the most tranquil situation, where routine conditions have prevailed since anyone can remember, can be born an extraordinary scenario, and perhaps an apocalyptic one. This is what 'disaster risk' can mean.

Addition 20-1-2012. Information subsequently released has tended to confirm the hypothesis of human error that overrode technical protection mechanisms and automated systems. Besides the implication of negligence, three aspects of this disaster remain particularly strinking. The first is the procedural failures regarding evacuation. Passengers (by then wearing lifejackets) were initially advised to return to their cabins. This could have led to high mortality if the ship had sunk in deep water. Moreover, opportunities to abandon ship before it started listing were wasted. Secondly, many other instances have come to light of large cruise liners, including the Costa Concordia herself, coming unacceptably close to Italian coasts. It is notable that legislation has to be enacted (by emergency decree) rather than relying on the cruise operators to excercise normal prudence and caution. Thirdly, statements made public by numerous protagonists, from ships cooks to managing directors, have been so contradictory that it is clear that the truth about this incident is in short supply.

Thursday, 10 February 2011

Offprints available

PDF offprints of any of the following articles and book chapters can be requested by sending an email to me at d.alexander@alice.it.

Alexander, D.E. 2000. Scenario methodology for teaching principles of emergency management. Disaster Prevention and Management 9(2): 89-97.

Alexander, D.E. 2002. Nature's impartiality, man's inhumanity: reflections on terrorism and world crisis in a context of historical disaster. Disasters 26(1): 1-9.

Alexander, D.E. 2002. From civil defence to civil protection--and back again. Disaster Prevention and Management 11(3): 209-213.

Alexander, D.E. 2003. Towards the development of standards in emergency management training and education. Disaster Prevention and Management 12(2): 113-123.

Alexander. D.E. 2003. Terrorism, disasters and security. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 18(3): 165-169.

Alexander, D.E. 2004. Cognitive mapping as an emergency management training exercise. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 12(4): 150-159.

Alexander, D.E. 2005. Towards the development of a standard for emergency planning. Disaster Prevention and Management 14(2): 158-175.

Alexander, D.E. 2005. An interpretation of disaster in terms of changes in culture, society and international relations. In R.W. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli (eds) What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions. Xlibris Press, Philadelphia: 1-15.

Alexander, D.E. 2005. The meaning of disaster: a reply to Wolf R. Dombrowsky. In R.W. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli (eds) What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions. Xlibris Press, Philadelphia: 75-81.

Alexander, D.E. 2005. Vulnerability to landslides. In T. Glade, M. Anderson and M. Crozier (eds) Landslide Hazard and Risk. Wiley, Chichester, UK: 175-198.

Alexander, D.E. 2006. Globalization of disaster: trends, problems and dilemmas. Journal of International Affairs 59(2): 1-22.

Alexander, D.E. 2006. Crisis intervention and risk reduction. In W.J. Ammann, S. Danneman and L. Vulliet (eds) Risk 21: Coping with Risks Due to Natural Hazards in the 21st Century. A.A. Balkema, Taylor and Francis, London: 51-56.

Alexander, D.E. 2007. Misconception as a barrier to teaching about disasters. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 22(2): 95-103.

Alexander, D.E. 2007. Making research on geological hazards relevant to stakeholders' needs. Quaternary International 171/172: 186-192.

Alexander, D.E. 2007. Disaster management: from theory to implementation. Journal of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering 9(1): 39-49.

Alexander, D.E. 2007. "From Rubble to Monument" revisited: modernised perspectives on recovery from disaster. In D. Alexander, C.H. Davidson, A. Fox, C. Johnson and G. Lizzarralde (eds) Post-Disaster Reconstruction: Meeting Stakeholder Needs. Firenze University Press, Florence: xiii-xxii.

Alexander, D.E. 2008. A survey of GIS and mass movement studies and some reflections on theory and methodology. Geomorphology 94(3-4): 261-267.

Alexander, D.E. 2008. Emergency command systems and major earthquake disasters. Journal of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering 10(3): 109-118.

Alexander, D.E. 2008. Mainstreaming disaster risk management. Chapter 2 in L. Bosher (ed.) Hazards and the Built Environment: Attaining Built-in Resilience. Taylor and Francis, London: 20-36.

Alexander, D.E., L. Bramati and M. Simonetta 2009. Emergency preparedness training and education in Lombardy Region, Italy: survey of supply and demand. Natural Hazards Review 10(3): 77-83.

Alexander, D.E. 2009. Principles of emergency planning. In U. Fra Paleo (ed.) Building Safer Communities: Risk Governance, Spatial Planning and Responses to Natural Hazards. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, Vol. 58. IOS Press, Amsterdam: 162-174.

Alexander, D.E. 2010. The voluntary sector in emergency response and civil protection: review and recommendations. International Journal of Emergency Management 7(1): 151-166.

Alexander, D.E. 2010. The L'Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government policy on disaster response. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 2(4): 325-342.

Alexander, D.E. 2010. News reporting of the January 12, 2010, Haiti earthquake: the role of common misconceptions. Journal of Emergency Management 8(6): 15-27.

Alexander, D.E. 2010. Rapid adaptation to threat: the London bombings of July 7, 2005. In L.K. Comfort, A. Boin and C. C. Demchak (eds) Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 143-157.

Alexander, D. 2010. Bioterrorism and pandemics: a new world order of civil defence. In A. Trufanov, A. Rossodivita and M. Guidotti (eds) Pandemics and Bioterrorism: Transdisciplinary Information Sharing for Decision-Making Against Biological Threats. NATO Science for Peace and Security, Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics Vol. 62. IOS Press, Amsterdam: 105-113.

Alexander, D.E. 2011. Mortality and morbidity risk in the L'Aquila, Italy, earthquake of 6 April 2009 and lessons to be learned. In R.S. Spence and E. Ho (eds) Human Casualties in Earthquakes. Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research no. 29, Springer, Berlin, Ch. 13.

Alexander, D.E. 2011. Sense and sensibility about terrorism: a European perspective. Integrated Disaster Risk Management Journal 1(1).

Alexander, D.E. 2011. Disability and disaster. In B. Wisner, J-C. Gaillard and I. Kelman (eds) Handbook of Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction. Routledge, London: 384-394.

Alexander, D.E. 2011. Towards a practical phenomenology of architecture and natural hazards. In G.P. Brogiolo, D.E. Angelucci, A. Colecchia and F. Remondino (eds) Teoria e metodi della ricerca sui paesaggi d’altura. Società Archeologica Padana, Mantova, Italy: 203-214.

Alexander, D.E. 2011. Disability and disaster. In B. Wisner, J-C. Gaillard and I. Kelman (eds) Handbook of Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction. Routledge, London: 384-394.

Alexander, D.E. 2011. Models of social vulnerability to disasters. Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais 93 (in Portuguese).

Alexander, D.E. 2012. Resilience against earthquakes: some practical suggestions for planners and managers. Journal of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering 13(1): 131-137.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. The London bombings of July 7, 2005. In B. Jacobs, A. Boin, L.K. Comfort and I. Helsloot (eds). Megacrises. Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois: 158-167.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. An evaluation of the medium-term recovery process after the 6 April 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila, central Italy. Environmental Hazards: Human and Policy Dimensions 11(2): 1-13.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. Disasters: lessons learned? Journal of Geography and Natural Disasters 2(1), 1-2.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. Towards a practical phenomenology of architecture and natural hazards. In G.P. Brogiolo, D.E. Angelucci, A. Colecchia and F. Remondino (eds) Teoria e metodi della ricerca sui paesaggi d’altura. Società Archeologica Padana, Mantova, Italy: 203-214.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. Our starting point. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1: 1-4.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. A tale of three cities and three earthquake disasters. Tafter Journal 50: 1-10.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. What can we do about earthquakes? Towards a systematic approach to seismic risk mitigation. Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 45(2): 1-16.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. The 'Titanic Syndrome': risk and crisis management on the Costa Concordia. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 9(1); article 33.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. Approaches to emergency management teaching at the Master's level. Journal of Emergency Management.

Alexander, D.E. and I. Davis 2012. Disaster risk reduction: an alternative viewpoint. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 2: 1-5.

Alexander, D.E. 2012. The London bombings of July 7, 2005. In I. Helsloot, A. Boin, B. Jacobs, and L.K. Comfort (eds) Mega-Crises: Understanding the Prospects, Nature, Characteristics and Effects of Cataclysmic Events. Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois: 158-167.

Monday, 22 February 2010

Italian Civil Protection Amid Privatisation and Scandals



In 2004 the Israeli sociologist Avi Kirschenbaum published an interesting and authoritative book on disasters entitled Chaos, Organization, and Disaster Management.(1) The core of this volume presents the results of a well-conceived academic study of disaster preparedness in Kirschenbaum's home country: in this it is laudable but unremarkable. In contrast, the beginning and end of the book are both startlingly heretical. The first chapter draws attention to the huge increase in disasters in the last half of the twentieth century and suggests that it can be explained by corresponding increases in the number, size and importance of disaster management agencies, as these have sought to aggrandise the problem. Kirschenbaum's prescription is given in his last chapter: to privatise disaster management and make it a subscription service offered only to those who pay for it in advance.
Avi Kirschenbaum's book ought to be required reading for policy makers who deal with civil protection, but what would they make of it? It should be a sort of cod liver oil for disaster managers--foul tasting but good for them. In other words, rather than inducing the reader to advocate the privatisation of civil protection, it should stimulate him or her to marshal the arguments against such a move, and they are as numerous as they are powerful.
Suddenly, Kirschenbaum's book is highly relevant to Italy. On 30 December 2009, the Italian government emitted a decree-law (DL-195) to regulate the clear-up of toxic waste in Campania, a very necessary act, given the enormous damage to environment and health caused by years of mafia-controlled dumping in that region. Almost unnoticed in this legislative instrument, Article 16 turned the national civil protection organisation into a private company, with the Prime Minister as the only shareholder. For weeks before and after the publication of this law, politicians and the public devoted remarkably little attention to it. Employees affected by it demonstrated, and no one took any notice. Trade unions fulminated against it on their web pages, and no one noticed. Suddenly, more than six weeks after the publication of the decree, it all fell apart. The government retracted article 16 amid a welter of criticism and adverse publicity in the country's mass media.
By 2009, as a result of piecemeal legislation that left grey areas and superimposition of competencies and responsibilities, the need to do something about the Italian civil protection system had become acute, as was amply demonstrated during the aftermath of the L'Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009. However, as noted above, the arguments against privatisation as a solution are powerful, for example:-
• the reaction to disasters needs to be a collective responsibility of society
• privatisation sits very badly with the selfless ethic of voluntarism
• it is open to abuse by commercial interests and organised crime
• it would be unethical for a government-sponsored company to make profits out of disaster relief.
General Luigi Manfredi, Vice-President of the Rome-based think-tank ISPRO, conducted a penetrating analysis and published it on the Institute's website.(2) Among his arguments were the following:-
• Article 16 of DL-195 is vaguely worded regarding responsibilities and the provenance of funds for disaster relief and recovery.
• It represents a form of privatisation of the civil service, but without the safeguards for personnel inherent in public employment.
• The relationship between the national Department of Civil Protection (an appendage of the cabinet of ministers) and the new company is unclear, and hence the latter's loyalties could be divided.
• The decree could lead to assumption of power without adequate democratic controls, or at least to the complication of a chain of command that in reality needs to be simplified.
And then, equally suddenly and without warning, the government retracted Article 16 of the decree-law.
In point of fact, this is not the first time that something of the sort has happened in Italy. To begin with, modern civil protection had a difficult birth, as from 1982 until 1991 political polarisation inhibited the creation of a viable system. The left wing feared, not entirely without reason, that measures adopted to combat natural disasters could lead to abuses of power and, in the last resort, to a potential coup d'etat. Hence, for many years the status of the country's disaster management organisation varied: a department of the Ministry of the Interior, a Ministry in its own right under a Minister without portfolio... And in 1999 measures were enacted to make it an autonomous agency, perhaps modelled on the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, but potentially even more independent of central government control. For three months in early 2000 the agency actually existed, and then it succumbed. Meanwhile, much responsibility for civil protection had gone to the regions as part of the devolution of Italy, fruit of the Bassanini law of 1998. Clearly, successive Italian governments have been torn between the desire to conserve power at the centre and that to offload responsibility to lower levels of government, and also between the desire to have a civil protection organisation under prime ministerial control or one that has full autonomy of action. The result is a mess which has done much to diminish public confidence in how the state performs in times of disaster. Rather than leaving citizens contented and feeling protected, they have acquired a dog's dinner of conflicting strategies, policies and legislation. As they say, "è stata una cosa all'italiana"--done in the Italian style.
Civil protection, or emergency preparedness, is as susceptible to corruption and scandal as any other field of public activity. In the USA the early years of FEMA were marked by accusations against its leaders, who were periodically driven into resignation. A detailed political analysis of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (after August 2005) painted a desperate picture of croneyism and incompetence in FEMA and its post-9/11 parent organisation, the US Department of Homeland Security.(3)
In Italy, many will remember the scandal that broke in August 1999 over the alleged misappropriation of funds and relief goods destined for the mission to Albania in favour of refugees displaced by the Kosovo war. Despite the flimsiness and inaccuracy of the allegations, several key officials were forced out of office, including the Undersecretary of State for Civil Protection. Conspiracy theorists, who abound in Italy, would regard this as a political means of effecting regime change in the civil protection hierarchy. It worked.
Currently, as I write, things are in a state of flux. Accusations are flying about corruption in the apportionment of contracts for the post-seismic reconstruction of L'Aquila. Once again, the accusations seem to be little more than business as it is normally conducted in Italy. The aftermath of the 1980 Irpinia earthquake, which affected 637 municipalities, led to corruption on such a scale that it has been suggested that only 25 per cent of the vast sums of money allocated to reconstruction actually reached the beneficiaries' This is remarkable for how little scandal it generated, not how much.
My fear is that we are in the middle of another attempt at regime change in the civil protection hierarchy. Currently, there is little sign of innovation or improvement in the system, which badly needs to be clarified, simplified and brought up to date. This is unlikely to happen amid a welter of legislation and counter-legislation.

Notes

(1) Kirschenbaum, A. 2004. Chaos, Organization, and Disaster Management. Marcel Dekker, New York, 328 pp.
(2) Manfredi, Gen. Luigi 2010. Una nuova società di stato. ISPRO, Istituto di Studio della Protezione Civile, Roma, www.ispro.it (accessed 20 February 2010).
(3) Cooper, C., R.J. Block and R. Block 2006. Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security. Times Books, New York, 333 pp.

Thursday, 17 July 2008

Helping Disabled People in Emergencies


Introduction

It is a fundamental principle in the modern world that disabled people should be given the opportunity to participate in modern society with as few impediments as possible. There is no justification for relaxing this principle when emergencies and disasters occur. Nevertheless, handicapped people may encounter physical barriers or experience particular difficulties of communication that prevent them from reacting effectively to crisis situations and stop them from using the facilities and assistance made available to people who are not disabled.

The whole question of how to assist the disabled in emergencies has been roundly overlooked. The body of academic literature on this subject is very small (e.g. Parr 1987, Tierney et al. 1988) and little attempt has been made recently to renew it. Moreover, the subject is seldom a theme at emergency management conferences. Despite this, there are some useful initiatives, such as the Verona Charter on the Rights of the Disabled in Disaster (ULSS20 Verona 2007), some study centres (e.g. the Centre for Disability Studies, University of Leeds, UK--Hemingway and Priestley 2006, Priestley and Hemingway 2006) and some manuals of best practice (e.g. FEMA 2003). However, state-of-the-art reports tend to be damning and to provide a catalogue of inadequate provisions (CID 2004, Tady 2006, White et al. 2004).

The purpose of this article is help redress the balance and encourage positive action. I will discuss some of the broad issues connected with disability in disaster, highlight the problems and indicate some of the solutions.

In the context of civil protection, what is disability?

The classic layman's view of disability is that of a person in a wheelchair who must be manhandled away from danger. In reality the issue is far more complex than that. To begin with there are many forms of disability: the list includes paraplegia, quadriplegia, deafness, blindness and defects of vision, mental illness and retardation, cerebral damage, stroke, senility and dementia, Alzheimer's disease, and, in fact, numerous forms of dependence on personnel, equipment and supplies for support to the vital functions that sustain life. Although old age is not in itself a disability, many very old people are frail and lack mobility, and they may also be ill or susceptible to various diseases and conditions.

In terms of classification, disabilities fall approximately into the following categories: difficulties of personal mobility, inability to see (with possible use of guide-dogs), deafness, problems of communication and articulation of words (as with stroke victims), cognitive disorders, various medical problems, use of life-support systems, people who suffer from intolerance of chemical or environmental substances, psychiatric disorders and panic attacks, and infirmity associated with old age. The list is long and impressive and, of course, individuals may suffer from more than one form of disability. Clearly, the different categories should be associated with a varied catalogue of provisions during emergencies, including transport for people with reduced mobility, specialised means of communication for those with cognitive or speech difficulties, provision of portable or substitute equipment for those who depend on life-support systems, and psychiatric support for those with mental health problems.

Disasters do tend to discriminate against disabled people. For example, in earthquakes, people in wheelchairs cannot take refuge under desks and tables, and neither can they rapidly exit a building down stairs (Rahimi 1993, 1994). People who are deaf or have defects of vision may fail to recognise danger or not hear verbal orders to evacuate (Kailes 2002). Furthermore, people who depend on electrical apparatus (dialysis machines, ventilators, or simply electronic means of communication) may find themselves in difficulty when there are power cuts during emergencies. Finally, all the services offered to people in disasters and crises--transportation for evacuation, shelter, counselling, and so on--need to be made accessible to disabled people.

It should be noted that the problem is not an insignificant one. In Tuscany, central Italy, 16 per cent of the population has some form of disability. Some 54 million Americans and 90 million Indians are counted among the disabled (and the disaster management law of 2005 in India makes no mention of them). At the time of Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf States of the USA, 155,000 residents of the cities of Biloxi (MS), Mobile (AL) and New Orleans (LA) were registered as disabled. By all accounts, many found themselves in dire straits when the hurricane struck. In fact, as 71 per cent of the 1,330 known fatalities in the hurricane were people over the age of 60, there is a clear indication that disabled people were disproportionately affected by the disaster (Tady 2006).

Although 19.3 per cent of the population of the United States--almost one in five citizens--suffers from some form of disability, 80 per cent of emergency managers contacted in a recent study (NCD 2005) had not made any special provision for the disabled in their plans. Indeed, 57 per cent of them did not know how many disabled people there were in their own planning jurisdiction, and only 27 per cent had taken a course offered by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on dealing with disabled people in disaster. The problem can become acute in a major disaster: for example, on 11 September 2001 a group of disabled people congregated in a room on the 80th floor of the World Trade Center waiting to be evacuated by firemen, but the building collapsed before any of them could be rescued (CID 2004).

We can conclude that major emergencies may put disabled people more at risk than other members of the general population and may impede them and threaten their safety with new barriers. Despite this gloomy picture, there have been more optimistic assessments. For example, Douglas Lathrop, writing in Mainstream magazine in 1994, suggested that "In some ways, disabled people who manage to live with a certain degree of independence are more able to face disaster than people who are not disabled. They have a 'psychological advantage'..." (Lathtrop 2004). That may be so, but we cannot and should not rely on the resourcefulness of disabled people to get them through calamity. Hence, the next section will consider what ought to be done.

Helping the disabled in disaster

In an emergency situation it is comparatively easy not to recognise the type of handicap borne by a particular individual and thus to offer the wrong kind of assistance. Moreover, the organisations that work in disaster tend to be accustomed to think in terms of providing assistance to large groups of people, whereas the disabled have individual needs that cannot necessarily be equated with those of groups. In fact, assisting the disabled in disasters requires, not only particular procedures, but also special preparations and plans tailored to their needs. Individual attention is labour-intensive at a time when manpower is at a premium. However, providing special assistance is one way of showing that, despite their being handicapped, the disabled are full members of society, with all the associated benefits, rights and privileges.

In emergency planning and management it is time to take into account the problems, special needs and points of view of disabled people. For example, most evacuation plans require the ability to walk, drive, see and hear. They should be adapted to the needs of people who cannot do one or more of these things (Kailes 2002).

The experience of being disabled in disaster situations highlights certain needs. For example, there is a question of how to ensure continuity of services for people who depend for support on electricity, the telephone, water supply or other basic services. Disabled people need to know how to manage when disorder and debris are present at home, and what transportation and mobility assistance will be available in disaster situations. They must be informed of how they can be resupplied with basic necessities in emergency situations and there is also a question of how to manage the needs of guide dogs (FEMA 2003).

One report (White et al. 2004) found that there were few if any empirical data on the efficient and safe evacuation of disabled people during emergencies and crises (see Kailes 2002). Moreover, in many places there is a lack of integration and co-operation between the various organisations that work with the disabled and the civil protection community which must plan for and manage emergencies. It is important to start the dialogue, for the issues are complex. No single emergency response strategy is valid for all types of disability. Moreover, the question of how best to assist the disabled in disaster is related to other issues such as providing help to ethnic minority groups, single mothers, and people with special dietary and medicinal needs.

The basic principles of assistance to the disabled in disaster are easy to list. First, procedures and services should be accessible in times of peace and in disaster. Emergency communications should be accessible, comprehensible and reliable. Disabled people's associations should be involved in civil protection activities and in the emergency planning process. Where there is a significant risk of disaster, appropriate preparation, education and training should be carried out for the benefit of emergency responders and disabled people who are at risk. Finally, efforts should be made to sensitise the mass media to their potential role as purveyors of emergency information to the disabled.

A guide to emergency preparedness written specifically for the disabled (FEMA/ARC 2004) recommends that they do three things, if possible. The first is to assess the types of hazard that are present in the workplace and at home. Secondly, they should endeavour to create a support network of at least three people for each site that they habitually frequent. Thirdly, they should estimate their own capacity to respond with self-protective actions in the event of a crisis. In addition, for kinds of disability that are not immediately apparent, it may be helpful to wear a broach or bracelet that identifies the handicap in question. These are examples of a practical approach that can go a long way to improving the safety of disabled people in crisis situations. However, this form of pragmatism is dependent on developing an appropriately positive mindset and attitude in the civil protection community.

Conclusions

As noted above, the academic literature on disabled people in disasters is exceedingly sparse (Parr 1987, Rahimi 1993, Tierney et al. 1988). This appears to be a sign that the problem is being neglected in both intellectual and applied terms. Yet it is clearly an important issue. In the words of Hemingway and Priestley (2006):-

"Disabled people have been made more vul­nerable to natural hazards through historical processes of exclusion and impoverishment. As a consequence, their experience of disaster may be more acute and long-standing than non-dis­abled populations. These effects are accentuated in poor communities throughout the world where disabled people remain amongst the poor­est of the poor. Moreover, when disaster strikes, disabled people encounter inequities in access to shelter or relief and are often excluded from full participation in response and recovery."

The idea that because an emergency or disaster is occurring normal rules are suspended should not mean that disabled people are left without adequate assistance. Indeed, it ought to mean the opposite--that efforts to help them are redoubled, and that special consideration is given to their needs on a priority basis. Moreover, crisis conditions should not offer any excuse to violate the dignity of disabled people. It is high time for the plight of the disabled to be considered in emergency plans. This is both a moral imperative and simply a question of justice and equity. It involves knowing where disabled people are likely to be when emergencies occur and ensuring that appropriate services are available to them. It may also involve an element of monitoring to ensure that discrimination does not occur.

In the European Union the publication and signing of the Verona Charter on the Rescue of Persons with Disabilities in Case of Disasters (ULSS20 Verona 2007) is a milestone in the official recognition that here is a problem which must be tackled. The Charter is the culmination of a project that has investigated the plight of the disabled in disaster in various European countries and has thus contributed to the formulation of a clear picture of the problem and its potential solutions. Examples of bad practice may abound (see NCD 2005), but there is every scope to improve matters. To do so would be a sign of civility and an affirmation of rights for people who, despite their disadvantages, are full members of society and are deserving of protection in disaster.

References

CID 2004. Lessons Learned from the World Trade Center Disaster: Emergency Preparedness for People with Disabilities in New York. Center for Independence of the Disabled, New York (see http://www.cidny.org/).

FEMA 2003. Disaster Preparedness for People with Disabilities. US Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington DC (see www.fema.gov/library/disprepf.shtm).

FEMA/ARC 2004. Preparing for Disaster for People with Disabilities and Other Special Needs. US Federal Emergency Management Agency and American Red Cross Society, Washington DC, 20 pp.

Hemingway, L. and M. Priestley 2006. Natural hazards, human vulnerability and disabling societies: a disaster for disabled people? Review of Disability Studies 2(3): 57-67.

Kailes, J. 2002. Evacuation Preparedness: Taking Responsibility For Your Safety: A Guide For People With Disabilities and Other Activity Limitations. Center for Disability Issues and the Health Profession, Western University of Health Sciences, Pomona, California (see www.westernu.edu/cdihp.html).

Lathrop, D. 1994. Disaster! If you have a disability, the forces of nature can be meaner to you than anyone else. But you can fight back. Be prepared. Mainstream (Nov. 1994), (see www.accessiblesociety.org/topics/independentliving/disaster.htm).

NCD 2005. Saving Lives: Including People with Disabilities in Emergency Planning. US National Council on Disability, Washington DC (see http://www.ncd.gov/).

Parr, A.R. 1987. Disasters and disabled persons: an examination of the safety needs of a neglected minority. Disasters 11(2): 148-159.

Priestley, M. and L. Hemingway 2006. Disabled people and disaster recovery: a tale of two cities? Journal of Social Work in Disability and Rehabilitation 5(3/4): 23-42.

Rahimi, M. 1993. An examination of behaviour and hazards faced by physically disabled people during the Loma Prieta earthquake. Natural Hazards 7(1): 59-82.

Rahimi, M. 1994. Behavior of mobility-disabled people in earthquakes: a simulation experiment. Earthquake Spectra 10(2): 381-401.

Tady, M. 2006. Disabled people left behind in emergencies. The New Standard.

Tierney, K., W. Petak and H. Hahn 1988. Disabled Persons and Earthquake Hazards. Monograph no. 46, Institute of Behavioral Science, Program on Environment and Behavior, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

ULSS20 Verona 2007. Verona Charter on the Rescue of Persons with Disabilities in Case of Disasters. ULSS no. 20, Verona, 17 pp.

White, G., M. Fox, J. Rowland, C. Rooney and S. Aldana 2004. Nobody Left Behind: Investigating Disaster Preparedness and Response for People with Disabilities. Lawrence, Kansas (see www.rtcil.org/resources.htm).

Monday, 24 March 2008

Disaster Management for Whom?


This paper reviews contemporary trends in the management of the crisis phase of disasters. It charts the recent history of emergency preparedness in the light of a basic distinction between civil defence and civil protection. As the former has metamorphosed into homeland security and the latter into civil contingencies management, so a distinction has grown between devolved and centralized management of disasters. This has been accompanied by differences in the strategies employed to bring relief to stricken populations, including the extent to which military and paramilitary forces are involved. Having considered the question of devolved versus centralized emergency management in the light of its impact on welfare, the paper examines the question by reviewing some aspects of the management of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in August-September 2005. It seems reasonable to conclude that symbolic aspects of the media and political response tended to provide impetus to discrimination in the provision of aid. In economic terms, disaster involves a complex process of negotiating for resources, in which the marginalized sections of society are almost automatically disadvantaged. The solution lies in making emergency preparedness more democratic, which is a major challenge for the present century. The article ends by establishing ten principles for fair and democratic civil protection.

On December 25th, 1972, an earthquake of moderate power and shallow focus situated under Lake Managua devastated large parts of Nicaragua's capital city. Of the population of 405,000 people, 4000 were killed, 16,000 were injured, 200,000 were rendered jobless and 280,000 became homeless (Kates et al. 1973). As was to be expected in the second poorest country of the western hemisphere, most of the victims were poor and landless. With access to capital and insurance, the small cohort of middle- and upper-class survivors rebuilt their homes and businesses in no more than six months. In contrast, a good many of the poorest victims never acquired the resources to rebuild (Bolin and Bolton 1983). The Managua earthquake was neither the first nor the last of what Blaikie et al. (1994, 2003) termed a "class-quake". On the other side of the great wealth divide of the Americas, the differential effects of disaster are equally visible in the impact of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans in 2005 (Rydin 2006).

Questions of equity and access to resources can be raised about any of the phases of the disaster cycle: risk reduction (disaster mitigation), preparation, emergency management, recovery and reconstruction.1 While recognizing the importance of social justice in the other phases (Richardson 2005), this article will concentrate on the issue of fair access to resources and services during the emergency phase of sudden-impact disasters. Specifically, the paper will:-

(a) examine the origins and growth of modern emergency preparedness, with emphasis on their implications for social justice and the apportionment of resources (my aim here is to explain how the present situation arose and what current trends might signify);

(b) consider some of the shortcomings of the response to Hurricane Katrina in terms of the implications for the further development of emergency response in the international arena; and

(c) on the basis of this analysis of development and trends, suggest some basic principles for the fair and healthy development of emergency preparedness.

Governments have a moral duty, and usually also a legal and constitutional one, to protect their citizens against foreseeable sources of harm (Beatley 1989). Thus society has acquired a complex set of laws, regulations, codes, norms, protocols, and regulatory bodies and agencies charged with the application of these instruments. The parts of this arrangement that relate to disaster prevention and response make up a system that is variously known as emergency preparedness, disaster management, emergency response or civil protection (Gillespie and Streeter 1987). Its history varies from country to country in line with the political system, type of state, dominant hazards, and--often--ideological considerations that affect public administration (Aguirre et al. 2003). One of the most common and significant differences between systems in different countries is that what works in a federal republic is not likely to be perfectly transferable to a unitary nation-state in which there are different divisions of legislative powers and sovereignty. Thus in many cases it is difficult to make emergency preparedness compatible between neighbouring countries; for example, the 25 national systems of the European Union vary between federal and unitary states, republics and constitutional monarchies, and centrist and devolved administrations (Sperling 2006). Differences are also evident between the levels of commitment and preparedness among the various US states and Canadian provinces (Scanlon 1995, Redlener and Berman 2006).

Despite the heterogeneity of disaster management arrangements around the world, there are some common themes and they are of particular relevance to the question of equity. The next section will trace the emergence of broad trends in emergency preparedness and consider them in terms of their implications for protecting society's most vulnerable members.

The origins of modern disaster preparedness

In recent decades there has been a gradual separation between civil defence and civil protection2 (Alexander 2002). The former has military or paramilitary origins and was created in order to protect civilian populations against armed aggression by a foreign power. The latter, which evolved 40-50 years later than civil defence, was devised to protect citizens against natural and technological disasters.

Modern civil defence has several progenitors. Prototype arrangements were made to protect the civilian inhabitants of large cities under threat during the First World War, possibly even during the American Civil War. No doubt there were many antecedents in the sieges and military campaigns of the more distant past. However, the clearest example of a prototype civil defence organization emerged, somewhat spontaneously, during the aerial bombardment of Guernica in 1937 in the Spanish Civil War. When many European and Asian cities were subject to intense aerial bombardment during the Second World War arrangements quickly became more widespread, universal and highly organized (Hewitt 1997).

Civil defence based on air raid precautions (ARP) gradually metamorphosed into a system intended to protect people and their governments against a possible thermonuclear bombardment. In reality, the consequences of nuclear war are both devastating and difficult to imagine. Hence the arrangements tended to be based on incomplete scenarios. There was little sense of continuity in terms of what would happen when people emerged from underground bunkers into a post-nuclear world, or perhaps a nuclear winter, in which life-support systems had collapsed. In any case, opportunities to protect the general public were extremely limited. Probably only Switzerland came anywhere near to achieving the goal of democratic access to radiation shelters: most other countries, and especially the poorer ones, would only have sheltered a tiny group of elite personnel, and in the event of a war the general public would have been left to fend for itself (Kerr 1983).

Hence, whereas ARP was generally broadly based, the civil defence arrangements of the Cold War were highly discriminatory. Restricted privileges were complemented by highly draconian forms of command and control, many of which were present in the arrangements for coping with natural disasters (Waugh 1993). Secrecy was paramount and, although it may have helped deny intelligence to hostile foreign powers, it also served to protect government officials against recrimination for their sins of omission or commission. Given that it was physically, logistically and financially impossible to protect whole populations against nuclear war, the emphasis shifted to protection certain groups--VIPs, political leaders and key government personnel--against the perceived threat (Blanchard 1994). In their most developed form, such arrangement could have been used to protect political leaders against the democratic rights of their own populations, or for various other abuses of power.3

By the 1970s civil defence had become an increasingly inefficient mechanism for tackling disasters, especially large natural catastrophes. It was excessively centralized, rigid and poorly adapted to the rigors of natural disaster response.4 Gradually, under the duress of repeated natural disaster, a new system emerged (Alexander 2002). Civil protection is amenable to development at the "grass roots" level of communities, neighbourhoods or local authorities (Boughton 1998). It recognizes that the local area is the "theatre of operations" when disaster strikes. However, it is not exactly a "bottom-up" form of organization, in that guidelines are needed from higher echelons of government, preferably originating at the national level (Perry and Lindell 2003). To a certain extent the growth of civil protection has been coeval with the relative decline of civil defence, though its reinvention in the form of homeland security has yet to determine a new status for civil defence or its potentially broader development, civil contingencies management.

Given the growing imperative of large disasters, civil protection has been relatively slow to develop. In part this reflects the universal tension between centralized and devolved government. A good civil protection system involves arrangements for tackling emergency situations that are harmonized across a wide variety of political units at various levels within a particular nation, but that are simultaneously adaptable to specific local needs--and of course sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable sections of the community (McEntire and Myers 2004). The next section will examine the question of how disaster management powers are apportioned between different levels of government.

The tension between centrism and devolution

A consistent theme in the emergency preparedness activities of government--indeed in most aspects of civil administration--is the tension that arises between central control and devolution. The balance between these two opposing tendencies varies considerably from one country to another and in many cases also over time with the evolution of the political process. It also tends to vary with the prevailing system of emergency management. For example public administration in France is strongly centrist, with power vested in the prefectures as representatives of the national state in the regional Departments (Lagadec 2002), while federal nations allow varying degrees of autonomy to be held by their constituent states (Scanlon 1995). The centrist-devolution dichotomy has profound implications for emergency preparedness.

The dictates of intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism policy and military participation ensure that civil defence is usually a highly centrist function. It thus tends to reinforce the tendency to manage major emergencies from the leading seat of government. Moreover, participation in counter-terrorist activity by civil protection forces is necessarily limited. However, there are several reasons why this strategy is inefficient and risky. To begin with, the local authority area is usually the "theater of operations" when disaster occurs. It is very easy for incomprehension to creep in when experience and problems on the ground have to be matched with orders from a distant seat of government (Hilhorst 2003). Secondly, disaster response really requires the support of its beneficiaries, and that can best be achieved by making them active stakeholders in security management, not mere passive beneficiaries (Kumar et al. 2005). Thirdly, when disaster strikes, local knowledge, expertise and resources should not be supplanted by imported assistance, which is usually relatively slow to arrive, often insufficient or inappropriate and seldom a match for what can be generated locally if communities and local administrations are supported in their fight against disaster (Milliman et al. 2006). Fourthly, failure to strengthen the local response is likely to have negative repercussions for the ability of communities to recover effectively from disaster, especially where careful co-ordination and substantial resources are required (Lindell 1994).

Some of these organizational questions are well illustrated can be seen in the response to Hurricane Katrina, as the next section illustrates.

Hurricane Katrina and the protection of the poor

As most Americans are only too well aware, two recent events have revolutionized--or at least galvanized--US emergency preparedness: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Calhoun et al. 2002), and the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf of Mexico coastline on September 29-31, 2005. They were, of course, radically different catastrophes. The first had immediate emergency management implications that stretched around the world (Scanlon 2003). It stimulated the largest reorganization of the US Federal government for almost 55 years and established homeland security as a national strategic priority.3 The resulting configuration of 150 federal agencies may have been adequate to face the terrorist threat, but faced with a large natural disaster it collapsed into what one researcher has called a 'bureaucratic nightmare' (Bier 2006) and another described as "the worst mishandled disaster I've ever seen in my life, and I've been studying disasters since 1949" (Walker 2005).

With the benefit of hindsight, the balance sheet for Hurricane Katrina is roughly as follows:-

(a) a well-developed system designed to forecast hurricane landfall timing and position had little effect on actual emergency management

(b) scenarios had been written that accurately predicted the effects if a hurricane were to make landfall at New Orleans, including estimation of emergency management needs (Laska 2004), but they had not had sufficient impact on disaster preparedness

(c) structural protection of large urban areas was patently inadequate (Foster and Giegengack 2006)

(d) evacuation needs were underestimated and operations were badly organized

(e) shelter requirements were underestimated and shelter was structurally inadequate, especially at the Superdome, where an estimated 20,000 people sought refuge

(f) some breakdown in law and order occurred, though it is difficult in the welter of mass media exaggeration and distortion to ascertain to what extent violence and anarchy actually prevailed (Walker 2005)

(g) relief operations were poorly co-ordinated, with distinct hiatuses between the actions of various levels of government and jurisdictions6

(h) imported assistance was badly managed and inefficiently used

(i) fraud was allegedly widespread in the handling and use of relief goods and money

Wealthy, mobile people with adequate financial resources fared relatively well; the poor and handicapped and people without cars fared badly. This was also a geographical problem of discrimination between rich, well-connected neighbourhoods and poor, vulnerable ones (Rydin 2006). One could argue that the same processes of social differentiation and marginalization were at work as had been present in Managua 33 years previously. Tierney (2006: 127) saw the neglect of the poor of New Orleans and the anarchy that prevailed when they were left to their own devices as indicative of the fact that "intergovernmental institutions [in the USA] are wholly incapable to responding to the needs of diverse publics during disasters." In a negative sense this observation is probably untrue, as the following section seeks to demonstrate.
The value--and perils--of a symbolic interpretation

The disaster movie as a genre likes to portray major emergencies as events that cause the breakdown of civil society and the emergence of the egotistical savage that is presumed to be latent in each of us (Mitchell et al. 2000). The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was no exception (Arnold 2006a). In the end the situation is supposedly saved by the forces of altruism in this straight battle between 'villains' and emergent 'heroes'. Such a grotesquely black and white interpretation of human behaviour is greatly at odds with the kinds of 'therapeutic community' that sociologists have identified time and time again in disaster situations (Barton 1970). However, it has gained symbolic significance to the extent of becoming almost a self-fulfilling hypothesis: the mass media frequently prefer the Hollywood version of disaster to the more sober, objective one presented by the sociologists. The following quotations from news bulletins issued on September 1, 2005, illustrate the media's addiction to "breakdown of society" scenarios:-

"Looters rampaged through flooded streets and survivors scrambled to get out on Thursday as shell-shocked officials tried to regain control of the historic jazz city reduced to ruin by Hurricane Katrina." [Reuters]

"Some 4,000 National Guard troops fought an uphill battle to restore order to the largely submerged jazz Mecca plagued by gun-battles, fist-fights, gangs of roving thugs, looters and carjackers. Residents reported survivors dropping dead in shelters or gunned down outside the local convention centre. Hospitals were evacuated after power ran out and helicopters ferrying patients and babies drew gunfire. 'This is a war zone,' said Melissa Murray, 32, a Louisiana state corrections officer helping in the relief effort." [AFP]

"Gunshots were reportedly ringing out and fires flaring around New Orleans last night as looters broke into stores, houses, hospitals and office buildings - some in search of food, others looking for anything of value." [CNN]

Whether or not looting, sniping, theft, violence, rape and other forms of anti-social behaviour were a significant element in the reaction to Hurricane Katrina, they were a policy gift to the new cold warriors, who were handed a bonus when Hurricane Katrina struck (cf. Berman 2003). Although later reports led to some rewriting of the script in favour of a more objective, sober interpretation, there is no doubt that considerable anarchy reigned (and it was not restricted to the public, as field reports of police behaviour include some bizarre stories). But it was centred on the poor. In the words of Tierney (2006: 119): "If current trends continue, disaster victims will increasingly be seen as 'problem populations' requiring strict social control, and immigrants and minority group members will feel even more marginalized and fearful."

There are various possible combinations of forces in disaster management, with configurations that are either more or less reliant on military support (Wright 1997). The tendency over the last half-century has been to demilitarize civil emergency operations, particularly in European countries. Yet Hurricane Katrina was managed--at great expense and with monstrous inefficiency--by a combination of military and paramilitary forces.7 At the most superficial level this represented a triumph of authority over anarchy, albeit achieved slowly and laboriously. Delving somewhat deeper, it represented the triumph of authoritarianism over representative local democracy. "Bureaucracy has committed murder here in the greater New Orleans area" as Aaron Broussard, President of Jefferson Parish in the South New Orleans area, famously commented in a television interview during the early aftermath. Though not discussing his own agency's shortcomings, he produced some precise examples of Federal and state failure to provide support for local actions; indeed, their tendency to hinder them (cf. Somers 2005).

Mitchell et al. (1989) taught us to assess the significance of disaster in the light of what else is important at the time it occurs. In 2005, the seriousness with which the terrorism threat was treated led to a considerable momentum in favour of bringing back civil defence at the expense of civil protection. Whereas one might interpret the failure of city-, county- and state-level emergency preparedness as a good reason to strengthen democratic participation in restoring it to effectiveness, the federal response was clearly to supplant local initiatives with those generated far away in the main seats of power (Eisinger 2006). Moreover, a report on Katrina written for the White House and published in February 2006 advocated bringing homeland security directly under the command of the Pentagon (Townsend, 2006: 54, 71).8

Several authors have commented that problems of the kind exemplified by Hurricane Katrina will not go away in the future (Winterfeldt 2006: 37, Foster and Giegengack 2006). In the meantime the terrorism threat has, in effect, scared administrations into swinging the balance back from civil protection to civil defence (Alexander 2002), despite the evident fact that counter-terrorism preparations are quite unsuited to the task of managing a large natural disaster. Moreover, this has occurred despite the fact that between September 11, 2001, and September 11, 2005, there were only five deaths from terrorism in the USA. Nevertheless, vast sums have been spent on preparing for CBRN attacks. Granted that their consequences could be spectacular and that they are at least partly preventable if prior preparedness is sufficient, there have nevertheless been remarkably few CBRN incidents in modern history (and very many natural disasters).

Parker et al. (2006) noted that the US Federal Emergency Management Agency had strong prior awareness of the hurricane risk to New Orleans but saw Louisiana as "a terminally ill patient", incapable of preparing itself for the impending event. Perhaps deficiencies in the middle and upper ranks of emergency management are inevitable unless there is a solid base of preparedness at the grass-roots level. This suggests that the questions of welfare and relevance to people's lives need to be made much more central to preparations for catastrophe (Kirschenbaum 2004).

Welfare and resources for emergency preparedness

This section offers some select observations on the question of the extent to which poverty is diagnostic of lack of protection in the emergency phase. Economists have viewed the impact of disaster as a form of accelerated consumption of resources (Albala-Bertrand 1993, Jones 1987). Accordingly, disaster relief and recovery involve replacement of the assets that have been consumed. The balance between the profit function of market capitalism and the welfare function of social assistance is temporarily altered in favour of the latter. However, the relative scarcity of resources for relief, recovery and reconstruction means that these are subject to complex transactions. In general, local government negotiates support from regional and national, regional from national, and national from the international community, if appropriate. Faced with scarcity relative to demand, higher levels of government must ration resources and apportion them between the competing demands from lower levels (Figure 8). Local authorities must ensure that resources are fairly distributed among beneficiaries (Lee and Low 2006). The degree to which this happens may be a measure both of how effective government is and of how committed it is to the welfare of its citizens. Variations from case to case tend to reflect the following factors (cf. Hogg 1980):-

(a) degree of political connectedness, influence and patronage: communities that are well connected with the national political hierarchy fare best;

(b) effect on voting patterns: places containing significant proportions of the electorate are most easily listened to;

(c) geographical proximity to the centres of power: not merely actual geographical connectivity (the ease with which communities can be reached in times of crisis), but the perceived remoteness or centrality of places;

(d) national strategic significance;

(e) economic power;

(f) how vocal citizens' associations are (Superamanium and Dekker 2003).

The question of whether disasters accentuate the division between rich and poor or do something to bridge the gap has frequently been debated (Maxwell 2003, Varley 1994). The consensus is that temporary patterns of social welfare and solidarity under emergency conditions soon give way to a widening gap as the poor are left behind in the race to rebuild livelihoods and structures (Arnold 2006b). In the worst cases, the plight of the poor is such that the term 'disaster' becomes entirely relative: normal daily life can hardly be distinguished from emergency conditions (Bradbury 1998). Yet poverty and vulnerability are not exact synonyms however much they tend to go hand in hand. That being stated, disasters must not be used to consolidate power over the poor and disadvantaged (Tierney 2006).

Conclusion: a manifesto

The hypothesis that disasters tend to reinforce the power structures that create and maintain poverty, disadvantage and marginalization has been powerfully argued (Wisner 1993, 2003). One antidote may be a cogent agenda to empower the excluded groups. Emergency preparedness needs to be made more democratic, or at least that its democratic underpinnings need to be defended vigorously. I believe that disaster management services should respond to the following ten principles:-

1. Civil protection must be a service explicitly provided for the population, not merely for the state in any of its forms.

2. It must be responsive to the security needs manifested and expressed by ordinary people.

3. It must involve people, in a participatory manner, in the maintenance of their own security.

4. It must give priority to satisfying the needs of disadvantaged groups.

5. It must be organized primarily at the local level, while higher levels of government must provide coordination, harmonization and support but not supplant local crisis response capability.

6. The service must be fully demilitarized and must be as professional as possible.

7. It must involve scenario-based, generic emergency planning, which is designed to reduce the vulnerability and tackle the fundamental needs of the general population of the geographical area in which the plans apply.

8. It must define sustainable emergency management and risk reduction and work towards achieving them.

9. It must be compatible with ecological sustainability and urban and regional planning that pertain to the local area.

10. It must keep the public well informed of any risks and contingencies that may require people to take action.

As principles 4 and 7 indicate, the welfare function of emergency management should not be allowed to decline under the duress of neo-liberal ideology (Wisner 2003). I believe that making emergency preparedness more participatory and more democratic is the fundamental challenge of the 21st century (cf. Quarantelli 2004). This means that significant effort must be devoted to encouraging local preparation, especially among the most vulnerable groups and neighbourhoods in society.

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End notes

1. As the phases are not necessarily strictly sequential (Neal 1997), people may be disadvantaged simultaneously in a variety of ways, for example by lacking access to resources needed to face both the emergency and the long-term aftermath.

2. For the sake of consistency and clarity, I am using the European terms, which are widely accepted elsewhere in the world, particularly in Russia, Canada and Latin America (Horlick-Jones et al. 1995). Their relationship to emergency preparedness and homeland security, partial synonyms in the USA, will be discussed forthwith.

3. In the 1960s several western European states were close to coups d'état, though in each case the news was suppressed for years or decades.

4. According to Beresford (2004), organized civil defense in the USA began as a local, civilian responsibility and became a national one as it was militarized during the Cold War.

5. Beresford (2004) noted that the term "homeland security" had been used by the Federal government since 1998. However, not until four years later did it become premium currency.

6. In the words of Bier (2006, p. 253): "many of the problems in the aftermath of Katrina were not due to any one person or organization, but rather were problems of coordination at the interfaces between multiple organizations and multiple levels of government."

7. Within a week of Hurricane Katrina 14,200 military personnel and 50,000 National Guard personnel were providing logistical support, search-and-rescue capability and security in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area. However, they suffered from fragmented command and incompatibility of equipment (Townsend, 2006).

8. There have, however, been some powerful dissenting voices (Mitchell 2003, Handmer 2006).

Sunday, 2 March 2008

Do You Want to be Commanded and Controlled? Reflections on Modern Emergency Management


It has long been clear that people react to circumstances on the basis of their perceptual models of reality, and that these may or may not reflect how things actually are (Burton and Kates 1964, Saarinen et al. 1984). Over the last half-century a considerable body of information has been accumulated on the ways in which people perceive and react to disaster (Drabek 1986). Emergency managers who know their field are well aware that public perceptions of hazard and risk present both opportunities to improve disaster management and constraints upon it (Scanlon 1991).

There are also wider questions of how events are perceived; indeed how the course of human history is envisioned. We tend to have a short-term view of things. For example, capitalism has become so powerful and pervasive around the world that it is often treated as if it were the result of some natural law of human organisation. Yet for much of human history it has not been the dominant force. The polarisation of society and competition between its members may to some extent be natural, but they are not the only alternatives for humanity. Relying as it does on competition, capitalistic organisation is something of an anathema to the welfare functions that go with managing emergency situations. This may explain why it is difficult and unwise to privatise disaster management (cf. Horwich 1993).

Secondly, there is nothing particularly immutable about the modern nation state. Sovereignty, fixed boundaries, territoriality, patriotism and national defence may have ancient antecedents, but their modern interpretations are not subject to any natural law about how societies should be organised. Many of the moral and legal principles on which they are based could be interpreted in radically different ways without loss of basic freedom or democracy. Terrorism has its origins and causes in questions of statehood and governance: on the other hand, natural catastrophes show no respect for political boundaries. Hence, both forms of disaster call into question the modern concept of statehood (Hewitt 1994).

In emergency management, the political problem boils down to a question of centrism versus devolution (Wolensky and Wolensky 1990). In principle, disaster management systems need to be organised on a local basis, with regional and national coordination of the many separate local systems (Sink 1985). In fact, despite decades of hard work by many different pan-national agencies, the world disaster management system remains in its infancy, poorly coordinated and unable to make the crucial effort to stop the relentless rise in impacts and losses.

Thirdly, there are broad questions about how knowledge is perceived and managed. The practise of dividing it up by department and degree is a remarkably modern one. It is also becoming increasingly counter-productive, especially in emergency management, a field which requires some level of synthesis of anything up to 35 academic disciplines. Moreover, in the present decade it is becoming increasingly clear that risks can only be reduced successfully by using holistic, integrative methods. This calls into question the basic framework of emergency planning and management (Alexander 2000).


Management and disaster management

In the modern world, the academic and practical discipline of management has its roots in capitalism (the organisation of production, distribution and consumption) and the nation state (through civil administration). However, disaster management has more diverse roots, and for this reason it may enter into conflict with its nominal parent discipline (Greening and Johnson 1996). Let us examine how.

To being with, in disasters, order does not spring from chaos by management alone. The essence of managing an emergency is to apply available resources to urgent problems in the most timely and efficient manner: in this respect ordinary management principles should be followed. However, there is also a vital need to understand and anticipate contingencies before they materialise--in other words, to reduce the level of improvisation in a disaster to a minimum. Thus emergency planning is at least as important as emergency management and should always precede it (Alexander 2002). The field is strongly allied to urban and regional planning, not least because both should tackle the question of the 'hazardousness of place'--i.e. reducing the risks of human settlements and activities (Britton and Lindsay 1995). Disaster management is thus much more than a technique to be learned in advance and applied ad hoc. It requires careful consideration of the scenarios for hazard, vulnerability, risk, impact and emergency action (Alexander 2000). It adds up to a need to develop techniques of "thinking the unthinkable" and "foreseeing the unforeseeable". This can, and should, be done.

The essence of disaster management is therefore not leadership in chaos--management as reaction--but rather the application of procedures that have been carefully worked out in advance. The degree of maturity of a country's emergency preparedness system can therefore be judged by the extent to which it is based on detailed (but flexible) planning and to which it is participatory. In my opinion, low levels of development are represented by the command and control approach (Waugh 1993).

Command and control has its origins in both warfare and colonialism. It divides participants into a disaster into commanders and commanded, and sets ground rules for how the former will control the movements and activities of the latter. Granted that some degree of control must be exercised over public safety and the efficiency of emergency operations, it is nevertheless easy to take this approach too far.

The challenge of the 21st century is to democratise emergency preparedness in such a way that ordinary people take more responsibility for their own safety. This will require them to know the risks, face up to them and make informed choices (Platt 1999). In extreme situations, it will also involve safeguarding their rights, not setting these aside.

Much progress has been made in designing and implementing civil systems for the management of civilian emergencies. The civil defence that grew up in response to 1940s air raid precautions and subsequent Cold War attack scenarios has mercifully ceded ground to civil protection against floods, storms, earthquakes, toxic spills and so on. But the cold warriors have not disappeared, they are in fact ready to stage a come-back. The terrorism threat is drastic enough to require more authoritarian methods of management than do most civil emergencies. It also involves different levels and criteria of predictability than most other non-military hazards. But need it require the suspension of participatory emergency management? Has anyone asked the general public whether it wishes to be commanded and controlled, and if so to what extent? Is authoritarianism really the way to manage great crises? These questions remain largely unanswered.

In addition, there are both small and large issues of democracy. With regard to the former, public support for emergency management must depend to some extent on sharing information and guaranteeing rights. The large issue is that command and control structures may in extremis be used either to safeguard the chosen few, rather than the public in general, or to safeguard the state against the demands of the public. At present there is a serious risk that civil protection services, which prize their own neutrality, could inadvertently be drawn into situations of extreme polarisation and forced to side with one party or the other. This is a risk that has loomed very large at recent anti-globalisation protests.


Command and colonise

A 1979 United Nations report on disaster management in developing countries observed that technologies and management techniques developed in Western countries are often inappropriate for managing emergencies in the world's poorer countries (U.S. National Academy of Sciences 1979). Knowledge and expertise are not necessarily directly transferable. Despite this, there has been a tendency to assume that such methods are etic--i.e. independent of specific cultural referents. In reality they are emic--dependent on assumptions about cultural acceptability and feasibility (Brislin 1980). Thus, in local indigenous circles, the foreign expert who arrives in an unfamiliar country and seeks to apply his or her knowledge to local problems has become something of a detested obstacle to good emergency preparedness (Allinson 1993).

The problem has its origins in the colonial epoch in such historical events and the British mismanagement of famines in the Indian subcontinent (Hall-Matthews 1996). It has persisted in the extraordinary poverty of solutions offered by countries that purport to manage disaster well and transfer their expertise to those that lack appropriate knowledge and structures. For whom are disasters being managed? By educating a professional class and diffusing a universal body of know-how are we pitting professionals against local people (Beatley 1988)?

At its worst, globalisation can be interpreted as an integrated system of commercial exploitation that has had the effect of increasing the world's income differentials, concentrating wealth in few hands, and spreading poverty, marginalisation and polarisation. If that is so, then it is a situation that facilitates the return of the colonial approach to emergency management, in which dissent, as much as disaster, has to be managed, order and stability have to be restored at any cost.


Conclusions

Is it inevitable in a divided world that we be separated into those who manage and those who are managed? In terms of preparedness for disasters the problems have steadily worsened, despite decades of hard work on devising new solutions. Besides the importance of well-known factors such as increased risk-taking, rising urbanisation and burgeoning populations in hazardous areas, the problem is also a result of the primacy of science, management and autarchic establishments (Wisner 2001). We may talk, not about policy, which ought to be sensitive to real, fundamental needs, but about "policy metaphors", which impose parameters where variables are warranted.

Civil protection against the peacetime emergencies that threaten populations need to be managed from a grass-roots perspective. The key words are 'participatory' and 'empowerment' (Wisner et al. 1977). Volunteer groups need to be trained and encouraged to improve their professionalism; ordinary people need to take more responsibility for their own safety (Wolensky 1979; Bowenkamp 2000). Modern information flows need to be the catalyst for sharing the burden of disaster. The technical component of disaster management is set to increase in both developed and developing societies. There will thus be a convergence of problems and solutions, but not one in which there will be any right or other justification for imposing solutions upon people.

In synthesis, the prospects for democratising civil protection worldwide need to be evaluated in the light of global trends in exploitation, diplomacy, hegemony and the uses to which new technologies are put. We must differentiate structure from mentality or mind-set. It is vital that the former not be conditioned by outdated forms of the latter. Neither at home nor abroad should risk and emergencies be managed by excessive use of command and control, or excessively technocratic management systems, or of excessive economic management by monetarism (Butler and Doessel 1981; May and Burby 1996). New paradigms of global security should not be used as an excuse for reintroducing forms of exploitation under the guise of preventing terrorism or forcing the pace of development.

In future years there will be an increasing convergence in emergency management systems between rich and poor countries, as both will have to cope with the growing complexity of modern disasters and the international dimensions of their impacts. It is essential that the convergence be based, not on rigid crisis management systems, but on a management process that emphasises planning to foster flexibility, co-operation and co-ordination.


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2003