A large disaster is a major milestone in the life of survivors. Indeed,
for some it is the defining point of their lives thereafter. Fifteen years have
passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET). Making use of
the perspective of time, this is a good moment to take stock of the impact of
this extraordinary event and the response to and recovery from it.
Few naturally-generated impacts in recent history have been as destructive
and all-enveloping as GEJET. Until the arrival of Covid-19, GEJET was regarded
as the "mother of all cascading disasters". It involved sudden
destruction on an enormous scale. It was a burden of cost for the whole of
Japan (the estimated economic damage amounted to over US$300 billion, making it
the costliest natural hazard impact in history). It was a searing reminder of
the power of nature and the impermanence of life. It was also a disaster of
extraordinary complexity.
Japan has a very high demand for electrical power but only limited primary
resources that can satisfy it. One of the two greatest steps in the cascade
resulting from the events of "3-11" (2011) was the nuclear radiation
release from Fukushima Dai'ichi. There is an ongoing problem of decontamination
in the northeast of Fukushima Prefecture. Forest and woodland, for example,
cannot be decontaminated without removing all the vegetation, an impossible
task that would cause further environmental devastation. Translocation of
contaminated forest materials threatens decontaminated land with radioactive
recontamination. There is a very difficult problem of what to do with low-level
radioactive waste derived from the decontamination efforts, much of which is
stockpiled in mounds of large bags corralled in open fields.
Under normal circumstances, decommissioning of a nuclear plant can take up
to a century, and it involves the problem, which no country has yet solved, of
what to do with high-level radioactive waste in the long term. Release of water
containing tritium into the Pacific Ocean is, by the way, something of a
non-problem. Everything on Earth is radioactive: we need to concentrate on
managing radioactivity that is definitely harmful. The intensity of activity at
Fukushima Dai-ichi (where 4,000 people work around the clock), amid the
constant search for novel solutions, means that the time to completion of the
decommissioning will be relatively short, but still a matter of at least three
decades, and still leaving residual problems of what to do with radioactive
waste of various kinds and strengths.
Evidence from other nuclear plants shows that Japan now has the most
stringent safety measures of any country that possesses nuclear reactors. Among
these measures there are checks, balances and redundancy in abundance. For
example, at Onagawa nuclear power plant in Miyagi Prefecture, 4000 people
worked for 14 years to improve safety and security before electricity
production could be restarted. In 2025 one reactor was finally brought on line.
These works, necessary though they are, must drive up the unit cost of
electricity produced by nuclear fission to unprecedented levels.
The enormous cost of rectifying the damage caused by GEJET, indemnifying
survivors and victims and providing future security has led to permanent
increases in income tax in Japan. This is a sign, and perhaps a rather painful
one, that disasters impinge upon everyone's life, and that they create problems
that can neither be avoided nor ignored.
Expenditure in the wake of GEJET led to some rather particular
developments. First, there was an unwritten compact with survivors rendered
homeless by the disaster that they would endure the rigours of temporary
housing for no more than seven years before permanent solutions would be
provided. Reconstruction was largely completed in that period. Rarely, if ever,
has a major disaster led to such rapid remediation, which is a tribute to the
determination and high levels of organisation of Japanese planners and
builders. Nevertheless, a note of caution is warranted. Very rapid
reconstruction has a tendency to shift some problems to an unknown point in the
future, rather than solving them at the opportune time.
Secondly, the desire to provide physical protection against future
tsunamis led to unprecedented levels of environmental modification. The scale
of this depended on assessments of what was the most opportune size of tsunami
to protect against. "Three-eleven" was a millennial event. Raising
walls against a phenomenon likely to occur once in a thousand years is not
practicable, from engineering, investment and environmental viewpoints.
Protection could, however, be provided against events with a 100 or 200-year
recurrence interval, and especially against 'near-field' tsunamis that offer
little advance warning.
The system of sea walls constructed after GEJET is extensive and imposing.
It offers visible protection but it has drawbacks. One is the high degree of
modification of valued coastal environments. Another is the tendency of sea
walls to pond inland flood water. At Miyako, in Iwate Prefecture east of
Morioka, the effects of the tsunami were particularly dramatic. Now, a
four-metre high impenetrable sea wall separates the port area from the town. It
is an aesthetic disaster, but perhaps it symbolises the tension between those
who would preserve natural environments and those (particularly the elderly)
who demand tangible protection against tsunamis at all costs. Given the trauma
of GEJET, one cannot point the finger of accusation at those who want the best
available protection in order to lead a peaceful and secure life.
The response to GEJET was not to build with nature but to build against
it, a paradox in a country that has a special reverence for the natural
environment. This poses the question of how are we to cohabit with disasters?
The standard answer is by a mixture of resistance (i.e., hardening, or in other
words building defences) and adaptation (i.e., modifying our risk-taking
behaviour). However, it is recognised that there are constraints, principally
economic, political and perceptual ones. Not all choices are compatible.
Before GEJET only nine per cent of Japanese coastal municipalities had
viable evacuation plans. During the tsunami of 2011 there were successes and
failures in evacuation, the latter particularly tragic. There are now
significant improvements in warning, emergency planning and emergency
management at all levels from national to local. One effect of this is that
there is more concern for the plight of people with disabilities in disaster
than there was 15 years ago.
We are living through a period of such rapid, or even abrupt, and profound
change that the past is no longer a reliable guide to the future. However, this
does not invalidate the lessons of history. Japan shows us the importance of
memory, memorialisation and commemoration of major adverse events. The
prototypes can be found in the monuments in Tokyo to the Kanto earthquake of
1923 and in Hiroshima to the tragedy of 1945. The memorialisation of disaster
gives us a reminder of the impermanence of life on Earth, the value of safety
and the need not to forget our history, including its negative side. Rather
than breaking down society, disaster can bring people and communities together.
It is important to remember the self-sacrifice of those who worked tirelessly
to restore order and safety to people and places that had been devastated by
disaster. We should also remember the very human reactions of people who lived
through that tragedy. Above all, we should learn from such events in order to
be safer and more prepared in the future.
Among the events that have followed GEJET, the earthquake and tsunami of 1st January 2024 on the Noto
Peninsula stand out. Damage to infrastructure was so great and so widespread,
and weather conditions were so adverse, that it was a major challenge to bring
rescue and relief to the survivors. There was also a sense of financial
exhaustion after the huge cost of restoring environments on the other side of
the country after GEJET. All governments face the difficult decision of how
much to spend on the problem of disasters, given that economics have to deal
with many demands upon national resources. In the case of GEJET vast
expenditures on housing, infrastructure and physical protection against future
disasters were made in places that had been losing population and economic
vitality. There are open questions about how successful attempts to revitalise
marginal areas after disaster are likely to be successful, given broader issues
such as an ageing population and a continuing drift to the cities.
To conclude, we are living through a new world disorder occasioned by the
abandonment of post-1945 rules and internationalism and the increasing impact
of new forms of technology, with which humanity has not yet learned to live.
GEJET gave rise to a vast and continuing scientific and research output
(overshadowed only by Covid). It is important that we make full use of the
research results wherever they offer the opportunity to improve living
conditions and safety. We are all at risk of disaster but we can all contribute
to reducing that risk.
